Ghanaian Strategic and Analytical Problematics: Notes Toward a Growth Exercise Paper by Green, Reginald H.
GHANAIAN STRATEGIC AND ANALYTICAL PROBLEMATICS:
Notes Toward a Growth Exercise
Reginald Herbold Green 
IDS (Sussex)
1989
By Reginald Herbold Green
On a cloth untrue
With a twisted cue
And elliptical billiard balls.
- Gilbert and Sullivan
Prolegomenon
At one level it is apparently absurd to argue that Ghana has not entered into 
sustained recovery and development. From 1984 onward GDP growth (which is 
unlikely to be grossly overestimated1) has been 556 or more annually averaging 
6%. In real terms output (albeit definitely not per capita output) is at 
record levels and by the end of 1989 should be 20)6 above 1980-81 (still 7 to 
10$ below per capita if natural population increase is about 3$ and 15 to 17$ 
below if net returning migrants really have numbered 1 million ). Real 
exports (even on reasonable estimates of falls in smuggling) are rising; real 
consumer food prices are falling; real wages are well above 1983 - albeit 
stagnant since 19 85; import capacity crises have been averted.
However, it is not as simple as that. The per capita figures suggest that 
regaining 1972 levels (before the non-coherent economic policy limbo of the 
Acheampang-Rawlings First Landing-Liman years) let alone late 1950s-early 
1960s peaks is still far in the future even at sustained 5 to 6$ growth. The 
import capacity growth has depended on rising real resource transfers 
(including IMF debt juggling) to offset rising goods/services trade deficits. 
The export growth is running into terms of trade and physical barriers which 
raise doubts as to its sustained viability or even feasibility. Falling real 
consumer prices for food - given free albeit highly imperfect food marketing 
systems - implies falling real grower returns. The assumption of surplus 
capital capacity available from either additional operating inputs alone or
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2with those plus high payoff rehabilitation is probably no longer valid. 
Personal consumption per capita has - apparently - not risen significantly 
since 1984/85. While for most households and sectors social disintegration 
was halted and partially reversed beginning in 1984, two caveats apply - 
significant groups have benefitted primarily from real food price falls (not 
increased empowerment to produce or higher real wages measured against 
non-food items) and the rehabilitation for the vast majority of households and 
social sub-sectors is partial.
Perhaps more alarming is the absence of a coherent long (or medium) term
strategy to focus on parametric constraint loosening whether to lengthen the
sustainability of the present structural adjustment with growth and measures
•3to mitigate social disasters (of adjustment or of prior non-adjustmentJ) 
approach. Without such a strategy Ghana is growing on good weather, external 
vested interests in the survival of a showcase programme in which they have 
invested massive resources and credibility, tight fiscal and monetary policies 
and luck. Those may not be enough.
Most alarming is the absence of data, dialogue or data development for
articulating such a strategy efficiently (in resource cost per unit of
constraint loosening terms) or of concretising it in a way that would be fully 
internally consistent let alone efficient in relative weights (in terms of 
scarce resource allocation) of different projects, policies, components. 
Macro external account trade GDP, urban cost of living and fiscal data are 
moderately available and reliable. Beyond that one enters a terrain of gaps 
and uncertainties (or even flat contradictions ) that are severe by 
Sub-Saharan African standards and represent one of the aspects of Ghana 1989 
not yet having clawed back fully to the levels of Ghana 1959-61 or 1969-72.
An Heuristic Applied Growth Exercise
Heuristically it is possible to construct a model which is not without
analytical bite and applied relevance. Ghana - as opposed to many key 
magnitudes - is by no means a social science terra incognita. For applied 
purposes it is useful to set the model up in terms of key constraints or
3parameters. Of these there are six: food availability; import capacity;
useable human capital stock; adequate working capital stocks and 
social/political viability.
Food Availability
Food availability over time can be represented for present purposes by trend 
growth of food production. Food imports other than food aid are constrained 
by import capacity and while food aid boosts to deal with weather crises are 
probably realistically projectable increases (or even constant) per capita 
levels of other food aid.
To avoid increases in macro inadequacy of nutrition the trend food production 
growth must be of the order of 3$. To reduce them (which also requires 
broadening "entitlements" including empowering small farmers to grow more own 
food and/or crops for sale and/or raise non-crop production earnings ) a 4% 
rate would be needed.
Three main avenues exist to achieving or sustaining (the present data can be 
read as showing a growth trend anywhere between 2% and 4)6) the level of growth 
needed to avoid a food supply parametric constraint:
First, improved infrastructure. Physical infrastructure especially transport 
to make movement of crops physically more practicable and also financially 
more attractive to producers and commercants is one aspect. Improved 
commercial infrastructure (institutional/enterprise plus physical storage and 
vehicles/vehicle repair) is another. The imperfection of the market is 
illustrated by the fact that no enterprise or government agency can provide a 
reliable year-long regular monthly supply contract for basic foods even at a 
current market price-linked payment formula.
Second, non-producer price incentives turn on unit cost reduction (primarily 
output raising with less than proportionate resource input cost growth). One 
such input is applicable knowled. •. another accessible "fair price" (in the 
sense of cost plus moderate commercial margins) inputs.
4Third, price incentives which are not readily provided within the present 
basically free market structures. The nominal "last resort" food purchasing 
enterprise does serve some areas of the private commercial sector's beaten 
paths but it does not have the financial, physical or institutional capacity 
to fill that role fully let alone buy up the whole surplus in a good year to 
make a minimum price guarantee real. The two practical routes are cost 
reduction post farm (e.g. lower transport from better infrastructure and/or 
more vehicles and repair facilities) to raise producer prices at any output 
level and farm unit cost reductions to raise the net from any price.
Import Capacity
This way of putting the forex constraint is chosen because the key limit on 
overall levels of economic activity in the short and medium term is real 
import availability. Achieving balance by contractionist routes would in a 
sense act on "forex shortage", an alternative formulation, but not in a way 
consistent with sustaining structural adjustment with growth.
Ghana at macro GDP level is not particularly import intensive for a small 
economy. This macro fact masks the fact of very real sub-sectoral (even more 
than sectoral) disparities. It rests on very low import intensity in small 
scale agriculture (even much of cocoa), most informal production and some 
services. The countervailing influences are some (by no means all) 
manufacturing, transport and communications, energy, mining, some 'modern' 
farming (notably mechanised, irrigated where at border prices import intensity 
may exceed 100$) and all formal Gross Fixed Capital Formation plus most 
maintenance.
Some reductions of import intensity are possible, indeed highly prudent. But 
structural adjustment if it means a broadening of the production base and 
sustained small scale agricultural and informal producer increases in 
productivity will have the opposite effect. At best import growth will need 
to parallel that of GDP if a 4 to 6% GDP growth trend with structural 
deepening and broadening is to be sustained.
Exports have macro GDP and sectoral GDP importances beyond providing import 
capacity per se. They raise the quality of import capacity because they are
5(probably) less volatile and certainly more fungible than net external 
resource transfers. More directly they provide incomes for small agricultural 
producers, exportable^ enterprise employees and exportable enterprise 
surpluses. And on a multiplier basis they affect the incomes of other sectors 
which sell directly or indirectly to exportable producers.
Export growth is constrained physically, e.g. there is little room for 
sustainable increases in logging; at present prices the foreign funding for 
much of the potentially plausible gold mining expansion will be lagged or 
unavailable. Its value in import capacity terms is constrained by price 
trends. Ghana may export twice the cocoa it did in 1984 in 1994 but will 
probably receive less import capacity for it. As its share of world trade is 
arguably above and almost certainly approaching the short-run price elasticity 
of cocoa the whole cocoa output expansion (or more accurately delayed 
rehabilitation until 450,000 tonnes is reached versus about 300,000 now) is, 
at best, problematic.
These constraints suggest a need (indeed an urgent, broad front need) for 
identifying viable export deepening (e.g. more pre-export processing) and 
broadening (new exports whether agro, other natural resource or industrial). 
The size of that need depends on how severe the physical and import capacity 
constraints on the timber-gold-cacao triad are likely to be.
Grants and very soft aid have macro GDP impact broadly - but not wholly - 
analogous to exports. They are of lower quality - marginally less certain, 
controllable and predictable; usually giving less import capacity per SDR than 
exports because of imperfections in sourcing; less fungible by use; higher 
import intensity of approved uses. Sectorally they have very different 
initial impacts - pro-construction, government and perhaps manufacturing and 
large scale commerce; anti-producers of exportables and those whose sales are 
concentrated on exportable producers. It is very unrealistic to expect much 
compensation to go to the losers nor to suppose that most are in a position to 
shift output except with high real income losses.
Hard (6% or over interest, under 5 years grace and/or under 20 years effective 
grace plus repayment including qu ai-automatic rollovers) funding has 
different implications beyond the short term because of the future stream of 
subtractions from import capacity. This is the inflow side of the debt burden
problem while rescheduling (including juggling such as converting hard Fund 
facilities into ESAF which is in fact soft because likely to be able to be 
rolled over) is one outflow aspect and running down the net stock by repayment 
the other. Debt burden costs - especially in Ghana - may be ex ante 
psychological ("animal spirits"" of decision-takers to borrow from Keynes) as 
much as ex post financial. The belief Ghana was about to enter a debt service 
crises has led to massive scarce resource (key personnel time) allocations to 
avert it by complex methods leading to ad hoc stopgaps and arguably has also 
led to imprudent caution on human and physical capital rehabilitation and to 
private enterprise investment decisions.
Useable Physical Capital Stock
Structural adjustment with growth strategies have assumed that significant 
leeway for expanded production existed within the existing capital stock. In 
simple versions the perspective was that import capacity for more operating 
inputs and spares and/or price induced boosts in domestic raw material 
supplies would yield substantial output increases. In more complex ones 
allowance has been made for deferred maintenance/rehabilitation investment 
(and consequential output gain time lags) but low incremental capital output 
ratios and rapid productive capacity utilisation ratio boosts are still 
assumed to be possible. These perspectives have been held in relation to 
Ghana.
To date these assumptions have not been wrong on the face of it with a 1983-89
recorded ICOR about 2.0 (perhaps 2.5 adjusted for tree crop and other
unrecorded investment and 'instant' resumption of over 55& plus growth within a
7year of instituting stabilisation/structural adjustment. The rehabilitation 
and replacement cost has been above estimate because a good deal of capital 
stock had become junk from non-maintenance; financial system and credit 
ceiling constraints did block some capacity utilisation growth which import 
capacity and physical plant capacity would have allowed; but by and large 
higher output expansion with lower GFCF levels than under normal growth have 
been attainable.
It is time to query how long this pattern can last. The large NFCF estimates 
are artifactual. They were first achieved by artificially cutting nominal
7depreciation estimates by half in 1985 and then sustained by continuing to 
base depreciation on historic cost - not the obvious accounting formula choice 
in a context of 25% annual inflation. Further, the recorded data exclude 
non-cash (and some 'informal' cash) investment which is crucial in respect to 
land development and - a fortiori - tree crops.
As a result it is not clear whether the probable pattern capital stock decline 
to 1985 and slow rise thereafter combined with six years of 5% or more growth 
of output as of the end of 1995 has almost totally wiped out relevant spare 
capacity. Arguably Ghana's overall capacity utilisation (excluding technical 
or economic scrap) is near 90%. If so, much higher GFCF (say 25%) may be 
needed to sustain 5% growth unless general factor productivity increases on 
existing (as well as new) capital can be achieved on a trend basis.
The need for sharply higher GFCF as a share of GDP to preserve 5 to 6% growth
would have two implications. First, because the total import intensity of 
recorded GFCF is 60 to 70% more import capacity would be needed for any level 
of GDP and, second, more domestic savings would need to be mobilised at the
cost of the share (and except in a 6% plus growth context the absolute per
capita level) of personal consumption and/or of public recurrent expenditure 
in GDP declining.
Useable Human Capital Stock
There is no doubt that non-adjustment and the initial consequences of
stabilisation austerity played havoc with Ghana's health and education 
services. Non-adjustment and drought did the same for average nutritional 
levels.
It is hard to quantify the meaning of these losses in terms of useable human 
capital (per person productivity). But it is even harder to suppose them to 
be negligible especially if physical capital utilisation at constant present 
productivity is near the full capacity range.
How much rehabilitation of healtr and education there has been is contentious
partly because empirical specif cation is hard either as to quality or
quantity but even more because neither useable real input (health and
education real resource input) nor crude physical output (cases treated, years 
of education completed) data has been collected, tested and analysed 
systematically. There are recoveries, there are new initiatives but there are 
perhaps unnecessarily severe financial constraints, continued deterioration of 
some surviving bits of the old structures and a time diverting, socially and 
politically disruptive, ultimately fiscally marginal or sterile shauri (a 
Swahili term embracing debate, row and near riot as possible meanings - all 
three of which apply) over fee systems and levels. For nutrition there is 
evidence of average recovery above 19 79 -8 1 levels but with regional and 
probably social and occupational sectoral exceptions so that how general the 
enhancement of capacity to work long and hard has been is unclear.
A related problem is access of human capital to physical capital (and/or land 
and time). This is a not inconsiderable constraint in much of small 
agriculture and the informal sector which lowers actually achievable output 
(and in wholesale commerce and transport constricts the growth of 
competition). In the case of women it interacts with total work overloads 
which have not been seriously conceptualised much less addressed.
Adequate Working Capital Stocks
Logically real working capital stock should ceteris paribus bear a fairly 
constant ratio to output and to utilised physical capital. When capacity 
utilisation is rising, working capital should probably rise relative to fixed 
capital. When shortages of forex/finance have resulted in just too late (as 
opposed to the fashionable neo-Japanese/post-Ford.ian just in time) inventory 
policies, return to efficient operation would probably posit a rising working 
capital/output ratio as well.
In principle, it is possible to quantify real working capital needs, to 
project them and to convert them to future current prices given macro and 
sectoral output and price assumptions (including the forex price as a sector 
for the latter purpose). In practice at least approximations should be 
practicable. From these less internal resource generation estimates the level 
of enterprise credit stocks (and lows) required can be derived and 
'allocated' among external commercial, domestic informal and domestic banking 
system sources. If this is not done r ro monetary credit ceilings can force
capacity non-utilisation which is inefficient in real output, surplus 
generation and potentially price stability as well as human welfare terms.
Whether a significant macro-monetary/sectoral real - conflict of policy 
goals/instruments has characterised Ghana is debated. Almost nobody 
(including involved IMF personnel) deny its micro reality; the argument is 
over breadth (of firms or enterprises impacted) and depth (total output 
needlessly lost) and over the costs and/or risks of macro imbalance or of 
inefficiency of resource allocation worsening from using a demand/requirement 
check on leading to modification of macro monetary 'safe' supply side credit 
ceilings whether these are with or without sectoral 
allocation/incentive-disincentive elements.
At first glance, the record of falls in real enterprise bank credit relative 
to real output suggests that the real output losses must have been serious. 
But questions arise as to how much credit through non-banking channels was or 
could have been taken up and as to whether institutional problems (in both 
borrowers or financial institutions) were the key constraint on enterprise 
real working capital stock levels rather than 'safe' supply macro-monetary 
ceilings.
Social/Political Viability
"The operation was a success but the patient died" is an epitaph traditionally 
applied to medicine. But it can be applicable to economic and political 
economic strategy evaluation/projection too.
That social disintegration in Ghana has - overall - been halted and partially 
reversed seems a reasonable starting point looking at most physical data. But 
in the absence of useable household budget or income distribution studies and 
of near constancy of per capita consumption from 1984 (admittedly on rather 
tenuous estimates) it could be a wrong starting point and at best is probably 
not universally applicable.
Political disintegration can come from gains perceived as inadequate or too 
costly ("structural adjustment fatigue") or from incendiary even if not 
dramatic in real impact policy miscalculations or mischoices. Ghana is not
10
disintegrating politically - at least not openly as in late 1980 and 1981 - 
but the degree of political alienation expressed openly by many trade union 
national leaders and implicitly in urban (but not most rural areas nor many 
small towns) disinterest in local elections (the first nationwide election 
cycle in a decade) could be taken as evidence of serious dangers (more serious 
ultimately than the September security service elements coup attempt).
This constraint pair are not reduceable to normal macroeconomic data nor, 
probably, even to econometrically specified/approximated quantitative 
analysis. But they are real - real enough to have overturned several SSA 
country SA programmes (and at least one polity) albeit none as long running 
and macroeconomically successful as Ghana's.
Heuristics And Useabil.it.ies
The foregoing model, even if constructed on logic plus overall directional 
change data and micro jigsaw puzzle hard information together with micro and 
macro observational data from Ghana, is not devoid of operational as well as 
more detailed analytical use. Some fleshing out and implications are possible 
before going to a rather more daring (and possibly both less precise and less 
accurate) statistical force fitting exercise. This can be done on the same 
six constraint/potential for parameter loosening categorisation.
Food Availability
The trend rate of growth of food output in Ghana since 1980 or 1984 is 2% to
4$ and is projected to remain so. Given a 356 odd population growth rate and a
continuing import capacity constraint, that range of imprecision is 
potentially disastrous.
GDP data indicate a 2/6 trend; a position also taken by the World Bank in
projections. Ministry of Agriculture main crop series (which have decreased
in number of crops covered and inherent plausibility of data contained) 
suggest 2/6 to 356, while district and regional data (nominally the sources of 
national data but apparently 'edited') appear to suggest 3% but with annual 
average scatter from -1$ to 5/6 (excluding the 1981—3 drought and 1984 recovery
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years) and wide regional scatter within years (e.g. as of 1986 the Northern 
and Upper regions were at best back to 1980 levels suggesting severe 
deterioration of the food supply position in the country's least nourished 
zone). The Ministry of Agriculture projects trend output growth at 4$ (with 
no indication of how drought years are handled).
4% or at least 3.5$ to 4$ is a plausible estimate of the post 1983 trend. 
Real urban consumption has risen perhaps 5$ a year (with population) from 
1984. Real food prices (relative to COL) fell not only in the post drought 
recovery years of 1984 and 1985 but also in 1986, 1988 and 1989. They were 
static in 1987 which was a poor climatic year. As of 1989 they are the lowest 
in over 20 years. This is in a context with no significant market 
intervention and a decline since 1984 in per capita food aid. As there is no
evidence rural households are eating less than in 1984, the conclusion that
food production is rising slightly faster than population is the most 
reasonable one.
Whether it will continue to do so is less clear. Production costs have not 
been falling in real terms, au contraire for tools and inputs so 'modern' 
agriculture is presumably less profitable (as its practitioners complain).
Ghana is not uniformly land short, but most of what remains 'unused' of
cultivatable land is either marginal or far from transport routes. The forest 
cutting frontier is retreating and will be gone by or before 2000. The
increasingly short fallow time possible on land near towns and in heavily
populated rural areas threatens yields over time because the traditional long 
rotation/low direct fertiliser input system has been modified as to rotation 
but not inputs. One probable factor in the mid- to late 1980s growth has been 
the restoration of much of the road system (nearly defunct in 1983, again 
above African average in late 1988) - increasing physical accessibility and 
merchant interest in collection and raising grower price (15 kilometres off a 
motorable road means at least 20$ lower food prices). This can continue in
respect to several regions (notably the Northern savannah zone and around Lake
Volta) but probably not in the Eastern Region which over 20 years has 
converted derelict cocoa land (disease swept) and logged areas into Accra's 
breadbasket - with very positive results on rural household welfare judging by 
1960s post cocoa disease versus 1988 post agricultural shift visual
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impressions of houses and shops and by provincial income, services and quality 
of life empirical estimates. It now has next to no forest land to clear while 
the remaining cocoa is profitable again.
The entry points for sustaining trend food availability appear to be:
a. regionally (zonally) articulated development of tested, small grower 
friendly, moderate input permanent or short fallow cultivation schemes 
which raise output per person year (women in particular have no 'spare' 
time at peak cropping seasons) and also increase the cash yield on 
saleable (beyond household needs) output more than the total (sold and 
self-provisioning crop use) cash input and tool cash cost increases;
b. in particular developing and testing labour intensive, medium input 
(including animal power), small scale, simple pump/small check 
dam/seasonal irrigation package rooted rice growing (analogous to 
successes - on peasant initiative - in Tanzania;
c. studying road location/grower price/commercialised output relations
systematically and devising labour intensive feeder road/track
construction and maintenance packages linked to main road and lake 
transport gap filling to extend the Accra and Kumasi breadbaskets, create 
one in the Western Region and raise real producer prices (by
transport/commerce cost reduction) in the Northern savannah zone;
d. develop a data collection and monitoring as well as a policy and 
programme design capacity capable of comprehending and acting to 
influence the sector - de facto now totally lacking at Ministerial level.
Food production trend growth at least equal to population is essential to 5 to 
6$ GDP trend growth because the import constraint and the real wage constraint
(in the Ricardian sense) are both binding. To achieve it with growing
population/land ratios, distance to market increases and a vanishing forest 
frontier and without either sharply raising real food prices, depressing real 
farmer net incomes or massive subsidies requires tested infrastructure 
improvement, output increasing/unit cost reducing programmes based on data, 
analysis and programme design. As c 1988 no ministerial capacity existed nor 
- judging by financial and evaluation report/expert time allocations - did
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either Ghana or the Bank see it as a priority. So bad were the data that the 
divergence between 2% (Bank) and (Ghana) food production trend growth was 
not even seen as worth serious restudy and dialogue despite the sharply 
divergent implications of scenarios embodying one from the other projection.
Import Capacity
Overall Ghana's import capacity has grown about 6 to 1% a year if measured by 
real import growth as a proxy. As arrears have been cleared (more accurately 
converted into IMF drawings now being converted into SAF/ESAF) and moderate 
working reserves built up, that method of deriving the 1982-89 trend appears 
plausible ex post. The issue is whether this trend is sustainable - as it 
needs to be to sustain 5 to 6% GDP growth on both World Bank and Ghana 
projections and also on any plausible evaluation of probable changes in import 
intensity from structural deepening and broadening and increases in GFCF 
relative to GDP.
The trend has been maintained so far by luck and ad hocery almost as much as 
by prudence and export expansion. In 1984 and 1986 oil prices plummeted while 
1984-85 saw a mini cocoa boom. In 1983-84 very high IMF drawings kept the 
import programme going despite bilateral donors' lag in coming forward while 
over 1984-86 quasi-commercial (especially export credit) borrowing played a 
similar role. When the bulge in IMF repurchase obligations threatened the 
programme, SAF and ESAF came into force (not totally coincidentally) to 
salvage it. And in 1989 - with cocoa plummeting toward the lowest real levels 
in 50 years reached late in the year - the Bank backed and largely secured an 
additional $100 million of Consultative Group soft money. Together with 
quantitative near doubling of cocoa and timber/products exports and a more 
than one-quarter rise in gold exports, these special prices of luck and 
bailing out have seen Ghana through today. But projecting luck/bailouts is 
imprudent (as opposed to projecting gaps as a spur to identifying how to fill 
them) and projecting continued high rates of traditional export growth is 
problematic.
Terms of trade prospects are distinctly gloomy. Ghanaian/Nigerian output 
recovery and Malaysia's ill-judged, worse timed entry as a major cocoa player 
have knocked the bottom out of the basically stagnant (at constant real
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prices) market of 1975-85. The two-thirds nominal price fall from 1985 peaks 
to October 1989 will not be clawed back in the foreseeable future and further 
falls are quite likely.
Ghana's share of world cocoa trade at slightly under 20% (assuming 300,000 
tonnes annual exports from 1989/90) is near or even above probable short term 
price elasticity (estimates vary from -0.1 to -0.3 clustering near -0.2).
There is, therefore, reason to query the net forex gains of further expansion
g
(rehabilitation) of output.
Output recovery from about 275,000 tonnes 'trend' in 1983/84 (160,000
official, 75,000 smuggled, 40,000 abnormal drought and bush fire losses) to 
315,000 in 1989/90 (300,000 official and 15,000 smuggled9) is real but not 
spectacular (about 2£$ a year). It relates largely to better (more labour and 
input intensive) practice in response to post 1985 (and also 1982) real price 
boosts. Fill-in planting resumed about 1985 (after up to 10 years near halt) 
and new or full replanting from about 1986 (after a quarter century's virtual 
hiatus). That suggests that 400,000 tonnes trend output by 1995 is quite 
likely (on trees in the ground by 1990) unless falling real grower prices 
reverse cultivation intensification. To keep grower real prices constant
(even so ending the 1984-1989 upward trend) will require either radical 
pruning of marketing costs or of government revenue. The semi-traditional 
one-third - one third - one-third split will no longer be viable barring a 
scenario of massive devaluation well ahead of domestic inflation which would 
be deflationary and, as an attempt to bolster cocoa, would be a device to
block or reverse world market signals.
Gold output may well be doubled by 2000. Work in hand or near financial 
backing allowing early action should guarantee a 25$ rise by 1995. Beyond 
that the present gold price slump - unless investors expect its reversal - is 
likely to limit entry of new private producers and firming up of finance for 
full physical structural adjustment of State Gold Mines' archeological museum 
plant, equipment and shaft/stope patterns.
Logging today is at or near the level of 1 million cubic metres which could be 
sustained from quasi rotational11' nanagement of "closed" (government) forest 
reserves. In fact 60$ of it from these reserves (allowing time for
implementation of improved forest management systems which are being/have been
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articulated). The other 40$ from "stool" (chiefly) reserves is a wasting 
asset. These lands will be logged out and field cropped or planted to 
economic trees with no realistic way of halting that trend available.11 10 
to15$ increases in cut by 1995 might be just prudent (followed by declines
back to present levels by 2005 ) but any further increase motivated by short 
term balance of payments considerations would be likely to be eating seed 
corn.
The step by step policy now existing ofbanning of raw log export and the
incentives for upgrading from rough cut to finished
lumber-veneer-plywood-furniture parts is the realistic way to sustainable
increases in earned import capacity from forestry. It could raise exports of
the sector 10 to 15$ by 1995 and ultimately double them. A similar - albeit
less dramatic, in that the gain would probably be 30$ to 50$ - potential
exists in pre-export processing of cacao beans into cocoa intermediates
(butter, paste, oil, mass, powder). As the major chocolate producers are
moving out of these products (i.e. buying versus producing themselves) there
is a market window of opportunity. Investment in further processing - unlike
that in more cacao bean production would not further depress the world 
14price. Ghana's three very old, badly laid out plants are not a good test of 
viability, nor is Cocobod possessed of intermediates marketing expertise but, 
if viability is established, new plants and marketing expertise could be 
secured. Unfortunately opposition - led by the World Bank - has meant that 
serious pre-feasibility studies are only now beginning despite suggestions and 
arguments dating back at least to 1950 (and indeed before given the vintage of 
the three extant plants).
But even with processing gainsthe plausible output and price trends on 
dominant (over 90$) exports will not yield more than a 5$ trend rate of export 
increase in import capacity terms, i.e. the trade gap will widen at 5 to 6$ 
GDP growth. World Bank and Ghana Government projections (which underestimate 
possible processing gains but overestimate probable cocoa prices) come to the 
same conclusion. In the past, except for 1984-85 these projections have 
tended to be too optimistic.
The implication is that a systematic review (not an ad hoc washing list of 
bits and pieces ranging from the va.l albeit small, e.g. rubber and shea 
nuts, to the problematic because of production cost, e.g. palm oil to the
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ridiculous at macro, and perhaps even micro, level, e.g. ginger) of export
potential and the least cost route to a 6 to 8% growth trend providing an
export mix less subject to the extreme volatility characteristic of cocoa 
prices is (and for five years has been or rather ought to have been) a 
priority. Non-traditional exports are rising. At the margins (especially in 
manufacturing) and in relation to the obvious and the low entry/exit cost 
items freeing the market does work. Its capacity to achieve structural
breakthroughs in exports (as opposed to its importance in creating a
foundation on which to build them) is much less evident - the South Korean,
Taiwanese and Brazilian cases suggest the reverse.
The second aspect of exports - domestic income and demand generation - is 
likely to track the import capacity results. However, a shift away from raw 
cocoa - and to a lesser extent from raw logs or timber - output growth to more 
processing and field crops or mining would alter income distribution by region 
and from small family farmers to wage earners. This can be overstressed - new 
tree crop exports and more food production (especially in the context of 
growth in GDP and real wage bill) are practicable shifts for cocoa growers and 
some forest workers. They might not entail high costs even in the short term
so long as cocoa and log output did not fall and real domestic cocoa producer
prices and forestry wages held up.
Soft resource transfers are unlikely to fall in real terms so long as Ghanaian 
real output rises and its policy package is one the World Bank will agree to 
back. Too much has been invested by outsiders in the success of the Ghana 
'experiment' for them to resile easily. What "aid fatigue" might do is halt 
real increases even though the trade gap at 5 to 6% GDP growth is still 
rising. Commodity aid is likely to decline because food aid availability is 
becoming tighter (physically) and Ghana is not a nutritional or economic 
catastrophe case. If a small scale rice production dynamic can be phased in 
rapidly and food aid focussed on wheat, gradual cuts by up to 50$ would be 
manageable. Because faster falls in food aid are likely, there is a 
sub-priority to see whether PAMSCAD inputs in kind (e.g. steel and some parts 
for tools and pumps, basic drugs, steel or aluminium for corregated sheet,
paper for educational publishing) can be up to free forex for wheat-rice-sugar
, 15imports.
If hard money is used the need for debt relief will become acute. If lenders 
perceive that, hard money will not be forthcoming. Thus the limits on the use 
of hard loans beyond selected economic sector prospects seems very limited. 
'Rebuilding' payments arrears on commercial imports could buy a few months 
time only and at the cost of higher prices (to offset risk and waiting time) 
reversing the image/credit access gains from 19 83-8 5 arrears elimination.
Usable Physical Capital Stock
The very long period of capital stock quality decay and ultimately quantity 
erosion makes capital stock estimates very problematic for Ghana. However, it 
seems reasonable to estimate about a 3 to 1 capital/output ratio (including 
tree crops) at macro level and a depreciation rate of 3 to 3-5 per cent i.e. a 
depreciation to GDP ratio of 10 per cent at or near full capacity 
utilisation.^
On that basis the following matrix results:
1980-81 1985-86 1989-90
Capital Stock (80-81=100) 100 85 90
T 33 28 30
Y 22 21 26.5
Utilisation Ratio 672 752 88%
Depreciation 3-3 2.8 3
Depreciation/Y 152 132 112
GFCF/Y 7 15
Using these and not the juggled historic cost depreciation estimates, suggests 
that at least until 1985 Net GFCF was negative i.e. capital stock was 
shrinking and that the recovery of the stock through 1989 has been limited. 
Indeed by 1989 it is arguable that capacity utilisation is approaching 90 per 
cent on average - a level implying serious sectoral and sub sectoral 
bottlenecks (full or overfull utilisation) already exist.
For infrastructure and construction that picture is true, e.g. in respect to 
electricity Ghana will need a new major hydro plant by 2000 - the 25 years 
provision of full national grid needs by Akosumbo/Kpong on the Volta is not 
extendible more than another decade. In agriculture - given technology and
infrastructure stock and abstracting from weather as 1980 and 1989 were both 
reasonable to good crop weather years - again output is near capacity. For
some services e.g. transport full or overcapacity conditions prevail. In the
case of commerce there is a conceptual problem especially for small shops and 
capacity utilisation is well above the I98I-8 3 period but some slack clearly 
exists with respect to physical selling space. However, the key question mark 
is over manufacturing. If - as widely believed - 1980-81 output was about 40 
per cent of capacity what is the situation now. Total capital stock has 
probably declined 10 to 15 per cent (non renewal and non-maintenance outpacing 
rehabilitation for the whole period). Output is up about 30 per cent. This 
suggests a I989-9O utilisation rate of 60 per cent or slightly above.
That seems low but is not implausible. Lack of raw materials have kept much 
textile capacity idle while de facto free trade in garments has idled much of 
that sector's capacity. Sugar milling is near idle because of plantation near 
demise while the metal products sub-sector suffers from imported material
limitations, partial rehabilitation and - perhaps - a partial product 
capacity/domestic product demand mismatch.
An additional possibility - true at micro level but of uncertain importance 
sectorally - is that high nominal (even if mildly negative real) interest
rates, 30 per cent premium and small lots of "second tier" quasi-official 
forex and financial system biases, as well as 1973“83 profit and loss 
patterns, discriminate against manufacturing in favour of shorter turnover, 
more liquid asset, better past profit commerce.
18
Usable Human Capital Stock
The post 1980, let alone the post 1970 or i960, deterioration of the health
and education systems has not been made good. Quantitatively this is clear
for health, less so for education - qualitatively it leaps to the eye and in
real resources used terms (and the growing imbalance between personnel and
others that emerged after the mid-19 7 0's) it is readily (if not very 
17precisely ) derivable from budget data.
Reconstruction and restructuring have begun with a somewhat uncoordinated 
melange of external and domestic in tiatives which may or may not be basically 
congruent. To project them is not yet practicable given their genesis after 
1985 and even partial implementation beginning in or after 19 8 7. It is clear
that fees - at best potentially yielding 10 per cent of Ministerial Budgets
and 2 to 3 per cent of total recurrent spending - are causing a
disproportionate amount of social resistance, administrative overloading and 
analyst-decision take time diversion for few tangible gains and a significant 
national human capital (as well as human at personal and family level) cost 
through continued exclusion (now for charge reasons) of absolutely poor
people. They are also an obstacle to decentralisation's effective
implementation and to serious community based and guided participation in 
programme design and resource mobilisation because both the World Bank and 
Ministry of Finance see them as centrally set in cash terms and at least 
substantially returning from local collectors to the central Treasury.
Nutritional improvement (a priority need for perhaps 30 per cent of the 
population and 20 per cent of the labour force - two thirds rural and one 
third urban) depends largely on non-agricultural real wages and women's 
(especially rural women's) workload reduction. The government strategy on the 
former - after a 19 83-86 doubling of real minimum wages to cover about half 
basic household needs and a 1986-88 increase in the ratio of public sector top 
salaries to minimum wages from 1 .8  to 1 to 5 to 1 in government and somewhat 
more in public enterprises - is laissez faire or negative. Only export 
oriented firms can in fact secure permission to raise real wages even when 
they believe profits would allow and productivity considerations justify doing 
so. The nominal defense of this line is that such wage increases would be 
inflationary. Women's work overload is half accepted as a reality but its 
reduction is not targeted, much less articulated, as a priority. Yet unless 
women's working, watering and tending the sick time burden is reduced, how 
they can expand directly productive activity is unclear. Moving to universal 
primary health care and broadening/keeping repaired rural water systems 
(largely boreholes) would appear to be the most feasible approaches with major 
time saving potential now identified but more study (especially on 




18Ghana since 1983 has accepted ~ tight domestic credit targets and held to 
them. Because they were below projected output growth times expected 
inflation times base credit levels and because actual inflation - except for
1985 and then only for domestic food - has outrun projected they represent a 
steady compression in real working capital extended from the banking system to 
all borrowers.
To limit the squeeze on the enterprise sector (somewhat misleadingly referred
to by the IMF as "private" but including state owned enterprises) the
government has eliminated net new bank borrowing and begun to reduce the base
levels. Even so real working capital stocks financeable by bank credit have
igdeclined for the enterprise sector. To what extent profit flows (margins 
have risen in construction, manufacturing and - probably - transport and large 
scale commerce but have declined for commerce as a whole at both wholesale and 
retail levels), informal domestic credit and external supplier commercial 
credit (especially to branches, subsidiaries and affiliates of foreign groups) 
have offset this is unclear since neither overall nor analysed enterprise 
statistical data and even less empirical analyses in depth exist. Probably 
the results are uneven and favour the enterprises (public or private) with 
good external connections. It is fairly clear some enterprises have been 
unable to raise output as much as demand and marginal cost would have 
justified (especially if a deferred maintenance component front end loaded the 
credit need and back end lagged the resultant cash flow) but whether this is 
sectorally (especially in manufacturing) or macro significant is hand to 
evaluate. To suppose a cumulative GDP level loss of 1 to 3 per cent (i.e. 1 
per cent in 1984 rising to 3 per cent in 1989) may be plausible with up to 5 
to 7-5 per cent in manufacturing, but higher guesses such as 10 per cent to 15 
per cent overall and 25 per cent or more for manufacturing are unlikely to be 
even approximately valid.
While Ghana's financial system is weak (cost inefficient, solvent but bankrupt
20if probable bad debts were written off and conservative/trade oriented) , 
this fact has probably not much hampered overall production response to date. 
It has hampered those firms with weak historic cost based balance sheets (past 
losses and/or no external guarantor) relative to ones which looked 'safer' 
which probably has been at least marginally less than efficient if only 
because commercial balance sheets in general looked better than industrial.
The practical priority for policy cross-checking would seem to be construction 
of a rough real (then converted to correct/projected price) bank credit needed 
to allow the enterprise sector to expand consistent with growth targets (and 
price increases) as discussed earlier, IMF opposition on grounds this would
license unlimited or wildly inflationary expansion appears somewhat 
obscurantist or needlessly pessimistic especially if it were done in parallel 
with the more traditional macro allowable nominal bank credit supply 
estimation process.
Social/Political Stability
Social disintegration was halted and partly reversed by the post 1983 fall in 
real food prices, the 1984-6 real wage increases (and to a degree subsequent 
ones in real salaries) and the belief based on government action (especially 
in 1982) that Ghana once again had a government with public concerns, policies 
and some capacity to relate the public good policies and resource allocation 
and that, therefore, renewed personal, household and community effort was 
worthwhile. That base still exists and is - on balance - strengthening. 
There is "adjustment fatigue" because gains have been slow (and indeed for 
many were concentrated in 1984-86 with little since beyond marginal actual and 
projected public service improvements) but this appears to act on political 
perceptions (and withdrawal) more than social relations and efforts.
The political viability of the government is not currently in doubt - except
21from a moderately unlikely well planned, externally assisted military coup.
This is not to say it enjoys mass urban or even professional understanding of
- let alone active support for or desire to contribute to - its policies. The
apathy in most main towns when 1989 brought elections for fairly significantly
empowered local councils was very heavy. Rural perceptions - at least on this
test - are much more positive in a majority of districts. While failure to
22regain the "Golden Age" of the late 1950's (probably even more golden as 
they retreat further into the mists of memory and oral tradition) is likely to 
continue to limit active support, even slow and uneven progress (in stark 
contrast to 1972-81) combined with a serious, public purpose oriented top
leadership will command some active and a good deal of passive support with
23few eager to rock the boat.
The political viability projection is probably dependent on the economic. If 
GDP growth falls below that of population, real access to basic services does 
not improve and - especially - if real food prices explode, then political 
viability will implode and social disintegration resume.
Some General Implications
Structural adjustment has become more complex in Ghana (as elsewhere) with 
partial recovery achieved and the most urgent breakdowns corrected. The need 
for more complex analysis to identify key parameters and how they can be 
loosened is greater than in 1983 when "more food or we starve/more imports or 
the economy grinds to a halt/more exports or we cannot import" was arguably an 
adequate working answer for initial programmatic use.
This is especially true as Ghana (in common with several other relatively 
successful SSA SA programmes) seems to have turned the criticism of many 
1970's IMF programmes "stabilisation without adjustment" on its head by 
achieving significant structural adjustment without stabilisation. In the 
earlier scenario external balance was sustainable only so long as 
output/demand were repressed while in Ghana's case output/demand recovery and 
growth is sustainable only so long as soft external resources plug a growing 
trade (goods and non-factor services) deficit.
The list of parametric constraint threats to sustained structural adjustment 
with growth and attention to basic needs and production by poor people is not 
atypical of serious SSA SA programmes e.g. Tanzania, Mozambique, Zimbabwe 
albeit each (including Ghana) has special features and different degrees of 
freedom (or lack thereof) on the common ones. All appear to be cases in which 
pure market mechanisms or the collective result of isolated enterprise 
decision, cannot be expected to produce satisfactory results. Market 
mechanisms, aid, public investment and weather (the first three in reality a 
take it or leave it package for Ghana in 1982/3) got Ghana where it is in 
19 8 9. In contrast to 1983 that is no small achievement. But on a 1959“ 
60/1983 continuum Ghana in 1989 is perhaps halfway back in per capita income 
and service access terms. The factors that have taken Ghana halfway seem 
inadequate to go the rest of the way unless augmented by strategic planning 
backed by policies and by resource allocations (whether statal or 
enterprise/individual allocations influenced by statal policy measures).
But Ghana has at the best only begun to build a strategic planning capacity 
and, partly as a consequence, has neither the data series nor the analytical 
studies and experience to develop sub-macro, sectoral and regional strategic
23
selection. If the strategic planning approach is adopted, the demand for data 
and analysis will probably be backed by resources and begin to produce a 
supply (as is happening in Mozambique and Tanzania). Without them, the 
planning especially when articulated to policy and project level will remain 
dangerously vague, qualitative, unsystematically selective and non-empirical.
-a-
NOTES
The methods of estimating 'informal' and 'subsistence' activity certainly 
do not lead to accuracy but do limit bias. Smuggling decline's upward 
bias on open GDP growth is arguably more than offset by apparent 
systematic underestimation of non-tree crop agricultural growth.
The official 1983 and 1985 estimates of 1 million and 0.3 million from 
Nigeria alone are suspect. There are estimates of 0.5 million for 1983 
and of 0.2 million returning to Nigeria before the second round of forced 
repatriations. There is still probably a small positive emigration to 
non-West African destinations. On balance 0.5 to 1.0 million net 
returnees over 1983—1989 seems plausible albeit highly imprecise.
The programme title is Programme To Mitigate The Social Consequences Of 
Adjustment (PAMSCAD). The retraining/economic rehabilitating of
"redeployed" (the obscene World Bank euphemism for sacked, fired, made 
redundant or terminated) persons is just that. But the broader labour 
intensive employment, vocational, primary and adult education, small 
scale infrastructure and primary health components really address poverty 
and productive empowerment generally largely with relevance to the costs 
of halted development and actual deterioration from non-adjustment after 
1972 (or arguably i960 or 1962 albeit that is much more debatable).
The GDP and various Ministry of Agriculture series give incompatible food 
output growth data estimates. All appear to conflict with the real price 
of food as reported in the (more accurate) Cost Of Living series.
These issues are broader than food production but include it and relate 
to households who are predominately own food producers.
Exportable as used here means a product which actually is in large part 
(say 40% to 99%) exported. It might easily be broadened to include 
products which could be exported at only nominally lower producer returns 
than on domestic sales, but not those products which are 
semi-structurally domestic market tied. In practice the dominant 
exportables (timber-cocoa-gold) have no significant shiftability to the 
domestic market nor, except for cocoa and a few timber enterprises, could 
the producers alter their output mix to domestic market items. Cocoa 
producers can do so (have done so) but at significant real income loss 
costs.
At the time 1983 was seen to mark the beginning of structural adjustment. 
The argument that until 1985 it was only stabilisation and that 1985/86 
is in fact the first SA year is consistent with Bank loan terminology but 
not with 1983-87 perceptions. In fact it was adopted as the Bank 
realised its initial 3-5 year target for SA was (especially on external 
account) hopelessly optimistic and sought to gain longer flows from 
donors by stretching out SA to 5 to 7 (or even 10) years and arguing it 
only began after basic stabilisation was completed or at least in full 
swing.
-b-
The case for a cartel may well be sound but the means to constructing one 
do not exist. The idea that Ghana should welcome a price war to drive 
out 'high cost' Brazil and Malaysia rests on two misconceptions.
Malaysia is probably the low cost producer and Brazil may be lower cost
than Ghana. Further, in practice financial muscle and overall economic
resiliance count far more in price wars than 'real' low cost
considerations. In those terms both Brazil and Malaysia could eat Ghana 
for breakfast and spit out the bones before the sun was above the tops of 
the cocoa trees.
Price differentials (using the second tier free rate for the cedi against 
the CFA franc) with Cote d'Ivoire producer (i.e. agent's buying) price
narrowed until 1988 and after mid-1989. In the interim high Cote
d'Ivoire caisse price there were in fact sellers' queues and little
buying so that purchases of Ghana cocoa virtually ended.
Quasi because a high, closed, mixed tropical forest - unlike some near 
single basic tree temperate ones - cannot be clean cut and recreated. 
Selective logging and repeated filling-in replanting is practicable.
In theory the state could 're-aquire' them and put them in the "closed 
reserve" pool. Given the nearly century-long history of vehement to
violent opposition to tampering with chiefly and individual land rights, 
before which the Imperial Governor and Osagyefo Nkrumah alike retreated 
in some disorder, no Ghanaian government is at all likely to pursue that 
'option'.
Excluding small tree and bush cut (largely outside forests) for fuel and 
pole wood.
Assuming an end to "stool" land cutting, full implementation of known 
forest management practices on "closed reserves" and no major 
technical/managerial breakthroughs allowing higher sustainable yields. 
The first assumption is 99^ probable, the second over 50-50, the third 
unclear as more data and practice adoption might raise sustainable yield 
from a conservative present estimate of 1,000,000 m^ to 1,400,000.
Intermediate cocoa product prices are likely to track those of raw cocoa 
once their production is largely independent of final product producers. 
The statement on investment does elide the fact that at least half of the 
cocoa plantation investment cost is non-cash, i.e. owner's embodied 
labour and waiting time (interest on the embodied labour) so can only be 
shifted to other agriculture in general and other tree crops in 
particular.
These are three of the five significant and broadly consumed food 
imports. The fourth - vegetable oil - can be import substituted out of 
existing potential palm fruit yield (i.e. not all now plucked) if the 
mismatches between demand, processing/distribution and smallholders are 
closed. The last - livestock - is predominantly barter trade. Luckily 
(since it is nearly impossible to control), it does not seem to pose 
serious macro or sectoral economic problems.
-c-
16. This is in large part an importation from analysis for Zimbabwe which has 
much better data. The immediate objection that Zimbabwean agriculture is
more capital intensive is probably of limited validity because of the
very large tree crop sub-sector in Ghanaian agriculture.
17. No sectoral deflators exist and given wage lags COL is a bad overall 
proxy and one which understates the fall in real resources other than 
staff relative to staff. Staff figures are suspect because from 1975 to 
the 1986-89 exorcism exercise "ghost workers" were a rapidly growing 
category quite aethereal as to work done albeit quite veridical as to 
their pay being claimed by their 'familiars'. Audited accounts are over 
10 years in arrear and semi-agreed Estimated Actual Expenditure data are 
neither readily available by sub-category nor necessarily reliable when 
they are because of the collapse and non-revival of the budgetary process
both in most spending ministries and in finance.
18. Accepted in the sense that actual levels have been IMF imposed, albeit 
after negotiation. The government is monetarily conservative but, left 
to its own decisions, would have set at least somewhat high enterprise 
sector credit levels.
19. For this purpose "dead" credit (funds already lost) do not distort. They 
do if needed credit expansion is calculated on a base with a significant 
proportion of "dead" credit.
20. A sectoral reform was instituted as a priority in 1988.
21. A less than expert and apparently not foreign linked attempt failed
totally in September 1989«
22. But also much better than 1989 let alone 1985 and most of all 1983 as the 
author, who was there and did analyse and write in 1960-61 and 1963-65 as 
well as 1985-8 9, can testify.
23. The PNDC (Provisional National Defense Council) does not welcome public 
dialogue and criticism except within parameters it sets. (Within the 
public sector technical and quasi-political economic dialogue is accepted 
and exists within rather wider parameters.) But that was even truer of 
the last three years of the Nkrumah government and then one could not go 
very far or talk to very many acquaintances without hearing a chorus of 
despairing to vituperative criticism which is notable not the case in 
1989 (nor was it in 1985). National TUC rhetoric is so sharply divergent
from enterprise level union leaders' formulations (made in the absence of
managers and state officials) as to lead to doubts that it in any literal 
sense expresses union member views other than as a symbolic 
(over)statement of their discontent with the limited, lagged improvements 
meted out to them (or allowed for them) by the government.
